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In recent years the incidence of Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganizations has clearly been on the rise as insolvent
businesses have sought to deal with cash flow problems and
other difficulties under the protections afforded by the
United States Bankruptcy Code.' Thus, the general practi-
tioner who previously may have had little cause to deal with
such proceedings is increasingly confronted with a maze of
unfamiliar laws and procedural rules in the bankruptcy
court, a forum different from that in which he or she may be
accustomed to practice.
Typically, bankruptcy filings come unexpectedly, al-
though the signs may be present to a perceptive creditor. On
the eve of a crisis caused by some precipitating event, such
as impending action by tax authorities or repossession of col-
lateral by a secured creditor, the debtor seeks immediate
protection of the court with little or no advance warning to
its creditors. The Code provides for immediate relief
through simplified procedures for filing a petition in bank-
* B.A., Drew University, 1976; J.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979;
partner, Isaksen, Lathrop, Esch, Hart & Clark, Madison, Wisconsin.
1. A total of 20,837 petitions under Chapter 11 were filed by businesses in the
year ending on September 30, 1983. Browning, Using Bankruptcy to Reject Labor
Contracts, 70 A.B.A. J. 60 (1984).
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ruptcy. Even with notice of an impending bankruptcy filing,
there is generally little a creditor can do to prepare for the
reorganization or to fortify its position.
This article will examine remedies available to a secured
creditor in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. The
rights available to this type of creditor have been chosen as
the focus of this discussion because of the great leverage the
Code affords that party. Although the discussion assumes
that the debtor and secured creditor are adversaries as a re-
sult of their conflicting interests in either using the property
or foreclosing upon the collateral, this is not always true.
The purpose of this article then is to give an overview of the
proceedings and to offer some insights into practice and pro-
cedure in bankruptcy court. Because of the article's broad
scope, it will only survey the relevant statutory and case
law.3
II. AN OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION
In order to understand the rights and remedies afforded
by the Code to a secured creditor, one must first become ac-
quainted with how a reorganization is intended to function.
The following is a brief description of the reorganization
proceeding.
A Chapter 11 proceeding is commenced when the debtor
files a petition with the clerk of the bankruptcy court.4
Schedules listing assets and liabilities of the debtor as of the
date of filing and a statement of financial affairs must both
2. If, for example, the creditor obtains an additional lien for an antecedent debt,
the lien may constitute a voidable preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
3. One caveat is that Congress still has not defined the bankruptcy courts' Juris-
diction following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, stayed, 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982),
which struck down the courts' jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982). Currently,
the bankruptcy courts act as referees under a delegation of authority by the district
courts by emergency rule. The rule has now universally been upheld by the courts as
constitutional. See, e.g., White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.
1983); Moody v. Martin, 27 Bankr. 991 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). This article assumes the filing of a voluntary petition.
Involuntary Chapter I 1 cases are also possible under I 1 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982) and
present many of the same dilemmas to a secured creditor.
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be filed with the court within fifteen days of filing the
petition.5
Upon filing the petition in bankruptcy, the debtor re-
ceives instantaneous and automatic relief in the form of an
automatic stay barring, inter alia, collection actions.6 This
filing creates an estate of the debtor consisting of all prop-
erty, tangible and intangible, then owned by the debtor. The
estate includes all causes of action and all property within
the possession of creditors.7 The creditors may be required
by court order to turn over property to the estate.8
Under the amendments made by the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act,9 the debtor is allowed to operate the business as
a new entity - the "debtor in possession" - which is en-
dowed with most of the rights, remedies and duties of a
court-appointed trustee under the Code.' 0 The rationale for
this appointment is the debtor's experience in operating the
business and the beneficial effect of such continued opera-
tion upon the chances for a successful reorganization.
The ultimate goal of a reorganization, distinguishing it
from a liquidation under Chapter 7, is the formulation and
confirmation of a plan of reorganization allowing the busi-
ness or individual to restructure debts and continue operat-
ing for the benefit of unsecured creditors and the economy in
general. To this end, the debtor must circulate an approved
disclosure statement to its creditors, which acts as a prospec-
tus. II Although the Code provides a limited period for the
debtor's filing of a plan, in practice, extensions are liberally
granted. 12 Generally, creditors do not have sufficient infor-
5. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (1982); BANKR. R.P. 1007(c). An extension of time may be
granted for cause, after giving notice to specified parties. Id.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
7. Id. § 541(a), (c)-(d).
8. Id. § 542. To determine the effect of a turnover order on a lien perfected by
possession, see U.C.C. § 9-305 (1981).
9. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1106-1108 (1982). As a trustee, the debtor in possession
may be subject to liability for breach of fiduciary duty, and is also subject to criminal
sanctions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 152-155 (1982), for unlawful acts such as concealment
of assets and embezzlement. The term debtor is used for convenience in the text
unless a distinction exists, as for example, in a discussion of postpetition conduct by
the debtor acting as debtor in possession and exercising the powers of a trustee.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982); BANKR. R.P. 3017(a).
12. One hundred twenty days are afforded to the debtor as an exclusive period in
which to file a plan, and one hundred eighty days are granted in which to have it
1984]
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mation with which to formulate a plan, although liquidation
plans are possible.' 3
Following circulation of the reorganization plan, ballot-
ing by creditors and notice of a hearing,14 the plan must
meet certain minimum requirements in order to be con-
firmed by the court. The debtor must generally obtain a
minimum number of votes in favor of the plan among each
class of creditors.' 5 Under certain circumstances, a dissent-
ing creditor or class of creditors may be forced to accept a
plan under what is colloquially referred to as a "cram-
down."' 16 In practice, most debtors elect to forego the uncer-
tainties of a "cram-down" in favor of negotiated treatment
of creditors under an agreed upon plan. Finally, a successful
debtor obtains confirmation of a plan and pays off its credi-
tors under this restructuring of debts.' 7
It should be noted at the outset that the purpose of a
Chapter 11 proceeding is to allow the recovery of businesses
and to simultaneously create an environment in which credi-
tors, especially unsecured creditors who might receive little
if anything in liquidation, are likely to receive greater pay-
ments. To this end, the Code grants a respite or "breathing
space" for a debtor to reorganize.' 8 It is during this period
of uncertain duration in which the interest of a secured cred-
itor is at greatest risk.
accepted. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (c)-(d) (1982). For a case in which extension of the
exclusive period was ultimately denied, see In re Ravenna Indus., Inc., 20 Bankr. 886
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (1982). See, e.g., In re L.N. Scott Co., 13
Bankr. 387 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re WFDR, Inc., 10 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1981). Liquidation may also be carried out without a plan under section 363. In
re WHET, Inc., 12 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129 (1982).
15. See id. §§ 1124, 1126.
16. See id §§ 1124, 1129(b).
17. Id. § 1129(a).
18. See, e.g., Inre Levinsky, 23 Bankr. 210, 215 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re




III. PRELIMINARY NOTICE TO THE CREDITOR: THE FIRST
MEETING OF CREDITORS AND FILING OF
SCHEDULES AND CLAIMS
In most cases, a creditor first learns of the filing of a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition through a notice from the
court informing the creditor that a petition has been fled, an
automatic stay is in place, and a "first meeting" of the credi-
tors has been scheduled for a specified date. 19 Before the
meeting of creditors, however, the debtor is required to file
sworn schedules of assets and liabilities and a statement of
financial affairs covering such topics as insider trading, pref-
erences and diversion of assets. The schedules are due from
the debtor within fifteen days of filing the petition in bank-
ruptcy.20 They may be amended at a later time.2' Unlike
Chapter 7 proceedings, the schedules constitute prima facie
evidence of a creditor's claim.22 Therefore, a creditor should
press the debtor in possession to amend the schedules if they
are incorrect or file its own claim as additional insurance
against a later dispute over the amount of its claim.
Depending upon their accuracy and thoroughness, the
schedules may provide invaluable information to creditors'
counsel regarding the debtor's assets, liabilities, secured sta-
tus, comparison of secured and unsecured debts to assets,
cash flow, losses, and greatest sources of pressure, as well as
the debtor in possession's likely relationship with trade cred-
itors. These factors may affect the likelihood of the business'
continued operation. Schedules vary widely in terms of in-
formation provided, in part depending upon the complexity
of the debtor's business affairs and the extent of its efforts at
compiling the schedules. Thus, counsel for creditors are ad-
vised to carefully review the schedules before the first meet-
ing of creditors.
The first meeting of creditors must be held within twenty
to forty days from the date the order for relief is entered.23
19. See I1 U.S.C. §§ 341-342 (1982).
20. Id. § 521(l); BANKR. R.P. 1007(b)-(c), 1008.
21. BANKR. R.P. 1009.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982). This provision does not apply to unliquidated,
contingent or disputed claims, for which proof of a claim should be filed.




The debtor's attorney will usually begin the meeting with a
short statement as to the cause of the reorganization and the
direction of any possible plans of the debtor. The debtor is
then required to testify under oath and submit to examina-
tion by creditors.24 The meeting is ordinarily presided over
by the clerk rather than the bankruptcy judge.
The meeting may also provide an important source of
information for creditors. The creditor's counsel may use
this opportunity to confirm that the collateral is insured and
protected, and to learn of its location, use and maintenance.
In addition, counsel may inquire about the potential for a
decline in the value of collateral, especially inventory, cash,
and accounts receivable. Counsel may also inquire whether
the debtor has any thoughts about a possible plan; the
debtor's answers will not, of course, be binding.26 However,
the debtor may be estopped from later disclaiming any rep-
resentations made or assurances given to creditor who have
relied upon them to their detriment. Counsel should also be
alert to other creditors' concerns for early indications of
sources of trouble in the reorganization.
Under section 1102(a)(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the court will appoint a creditors' committee of the
seven largest unsecured creditors. They are afforded certain
powers, including the right to obtain counsel, the cost of
which eventually may be reimbursed by the debtor as a cost
of administration. 27 If a secured creditor believes that it may
be undersecured because of the value of its collateral on the
date of filing, it may be able, on the basis of its unsecured
claim, to exert additional leverage on the debtor by serving
on the creditors' committee29
24. 11 U.S.C. § 343 (1982). On motion, other persons may also be required to
submit to examination under Bankruptcy Rule 2004. In an appropriate case, the
debtor may even be apprehended and brought in for examination under Bankruptcy
Rule 2005.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 341(c) (1982); BANKR. R.P. 2003(b).
26. While a plan may be filed with the petition, in practice it is quite unusual
beause of the "I lth hour" nature of most filings.
27. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103 (1982).
28. See id. § 506(a) regarding bifurcation of claims. See also BANKR. R.P. 3012.
29. However, the presence of such a creditor on the committee might constitute a
conflict of interest as the creditor will seek the greatest return on its secured claim, to
the detriment of unsecured creditors.
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IV. THE PRIMARY BATTLEGROUND: RELIEF FROM STAY
UNDER SECTION 362 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
After the petition in bankruptcy is filed, an automatic
stay is imposed.30 The stay has serious ramifications for all
creditors. The automatic stay is consistent with the policy of
the Code to afford "breathing space" to a debtor in which to
reorganize and sort out its business affairs.31 Under section
362(b), the Code also enjoins the commencement or continu-
ation of judicial, administrative or other proceedings (such
as arbitration), including the issuance or employment of pro-
cess against the debtor, or attempts to recover a prepetition
claim against the debtor. Similarly, attempts to enforce a
prepetition judgment against the debtor or the property of
the estate are barred. Also barred are attempts to perfect and
secure other interests.32 In effect, the stay prevents perfection
of secured liens and debt collection, including replevin, gar-
nishment, demands and foreclosures.33
Among exceptions to the scope of the stay are all govern-
mental actions under an agency's police or regulatory pow-
ers (as opposed to debt collection) and enforcement of such
judgments, other than money judgments.34 Criminal prose-
cutions against the debtor are also not enjoined unless they
30. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
31. See, e.g., In re State Employees' Retirement Fund v. Roane, 14 Bankr. 542,
543 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also, e.g., In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367, 369 (2d Cir.
1971) (Code evinces congressional mandate to encourage attempts at corporate reor-
ganization); In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 Bankr. 720, 722 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1982) (there exists a presumption in favor of reorganization); In re Levinsky, 23
Bankr. 210, 215 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Chapter 11 grants a respite for a debtor in
which to reorganize); In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)
(purpose of reorganization is preservation of economic entity and avoidance of
dismantlement).
32. The following are not allowed: any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate; any act to create, perfect or enforce a lien against property of the estate; any act
to create, perfect or enforce against the property of the debtor a lien to the extent it
secures a prepetition claim; any act to collect, assess or recover a prepetition claim
against the debtor; the setoff of any prepetition debt owing to the debtor against any
claim against the debtor; and the commencement of proceedings before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor. I 1 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
33. In re Scott, 24 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1982) (voiding foreclosure). But
see Martinson v. First Nat'l Bank of Oakes (In re Martinson), 26 Bankr. 648 (D.N.D.
1983) (sheriffs act of transferring legal title at end of redemption period not stayed).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982).
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involve debt collection, such as restitution for a bad check.
Certain actions to perfect a hen are also allowed,36 as well as
actions against third party codefendants or guarantors.37 A
debt may also be accelerated under a contractual provision
for default as long as no action is taken to collect on the
debt.38 The cases are in conffict over whether the automatic
stay tolls periods of redemption under state law, 39 although
statutes of limitation are extended.4°
Under section 362(c), the stay is in effect until the prop-
erty in question is no longer property of the estate, the case is
closed or dismissed, or a discharge is granted. Violation of
the automatic stay subjects a creditor to contempt sanctions,
even if such action is taken with no knowledge of the stay.4 t
However, the likelihood of imposition of contempt sanctions
under such circumstances is slight.
State court actions involving secured creditors which are
pending, but stayed, may be removed to the bankruptcy
court under Code section 1478. In addition, some prepetition
claims may be commenced as adversary proceedings in
bankruptcy court.42
35. Id. § 362(b)(1). See also Alan I.W. Frank Corp. v. P.M.A., Inc. (In re Alan
I.W. Frank Corp.), 19 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (action against debtor and its
president stayed).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1982).
37. See, e.g., Royal Truck Trailer, Inc. v. Armadora Maritima Salvadorena, 10
Bankr. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1981); GAF Corp. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 26 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
38. See, e.g., LHD Realty Corp. v. National Life Ins. Co., 726 F.2d 327, 332 (7th
Cir. 1984) (section 362 automatic stay does not preclude acceleration of debt). Contra
In re Davidson Lumber, 24 Bankr. 49, 51 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). The plan may
nevertheless roll back or reverse acceleration of a debt under 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2)
(1982). The debt may also survive without acceleration under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(a)(5)(G) (1982) pursuant to cure or waiver of any default.
39. Compare Bank of Commonwealth v. Beran, 13 Bankr. 989 (E.D. Mich. 1981);
In re H & W Enter., Inc., 19 Bankr. 582 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (stay tolls redemp-
tion period); United Bank of Loves Park v. Dohm (In re Dohm), 14 Bankr. 701
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); Moratzka v. Lanesboro State Bank (In re Johnson), 8 Bankr.
371 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981), with In re Martinson, 26 Bankr. 648 (Bankr. D.N.D.
1983) (automatic stay provision does not toll running of redemption period); Ecklund
v. Swedlund Dev. Corp. v. Hennepin Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis (In re
Ecklund & Swedlund Dev. Corp.), 17 Bankr. 451 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1982).
41. Thacker v. Etter (In re Thacker), 24 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
42. BANKR. R.P. 7001-7087 govern procedure in such cases. An interesting ques-
tion is whether a state court may be permitted to continue solely for the purpose of
[Vol. 67:421
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As the previous discussion indicates, the Code reverses
the usual procedure in which a party must first make an ade-
quate showing of irreparable harm to a court in order to be
entitled to injunctive relief. Since the intent of section 362 is
to afford the debtor immediate protection to prevent diminu-
tion of the estate, with its impact upon chances for a success-
ful rehabilitation, the Code presumes the likelihood of such
harm and automatically imposes the stay. If the stay is chal-
lenged, however, the burden shifts to the debtor to justify
continued imposition of the injunction.43 The grounds for
relief from the stay, contained in Code sections 362(d)(1)
and (2), are discussed in detail in the following subsection.
A. Substantive Bases for Relief from Stay
1. The Initial Question: Perfection of the Lien
In considering whether to seek relief from stay, the first
question is whether the creditor's claim is actually secured. 44
A recent granting of a lien, if not contemporaneous with the
debt, is suspect and may be open to challenge as a voidable
preference. 45 Failure to perfect a lien means that while the
lien may constitute an enforceable interest against the
debtor, it is rendered subordinate to the positions of other
secured creditors with perfected interests who might other-
wise hold liens junior to those of the unperfected creditor.
An unperfected lien may also be set aside by the debtor
under section 544(a)(1) which imputes the avoidance powers
of a lien creditor under state law to the debtor in possession
acting as trustee.
determining the question of priority of conflicting security interests in a declaratory
judgment action.
43. 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 362.06, at 362-43 to 362-46 (3d ed.
1984).
44. A creditor is not entitled to adequate protection under section 362 if its secur-
ity interest is unperfected on the date of filing. Cable Sys., Inc. v. Coors of the Cum-
berland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 313, 320 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)-(c) (1982). See also id § 545 (voidable statutory
liens). New prepetition liens are not voidable if given for new value as purchase
money security interests. Id. § 547(c)(3). They are also not voidable if they constitute
a perfected security interest in inventory, a receivable or proceeds of either under a
continuing security agreement, except to the extent the secured creditor has improved
its position to the detriment of unsecured creditors. Id. § 547(c)(5). An action to
determine validity of a lien is an adversary proceeding. BANKR. R.P. 7001.
1984]
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The debtor in possession may thus upset an unperfected
security interest under these powers for the benefit of re-
maining creditors through enlargement of the assets of the
estate available to fund a plan. This is an especially preva-
lent practice with regard to disguised security interests under
the Uniform Commercial Code which, although denomi-
nated as "lease arrangements," may be found to constitute
purchase agreements with the lodging of title in the debtor.46
Finally, it should be noted that Code section 552(b) pro-
vides an exception to the general rule contained in section
552(a) that property acquired by the estate or the debtor af-
ter commencement of the case is not subject to a lien result-ing from a prepetition security agreement. Section 552(b)
permits prepetition security interests in proceeds of prepeti-
tion collateral under a continuing security agreement unless
the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equi-
ties of the case, orders otherwise.47
2. Relief for Cause, Including Lack of Adequate
Protection of the Creditor's Interest
Section 362(d)(1) provides the first basis for relief from
stay: relief may be granted for cause, including lack of ade-
quate protection of the interest of a secured party under sec-
tion 361. Although the term "cause" is not defined in the
Code, the courts have construed it to include bad faith in the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy when the debtor has no
means of reorganizing and it can be shown that the petition
was filed solely to harass or delay creditors from realization
46. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1981) (definition of a security interest); U.C.C. §§ 9-
102, 2-401(l),(2) (1981). This question, which potentially involves high stakes for
both parties, has prompted much litigation. See, e.g., Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Eastern
Equip. Co. (In re Eastern Equip. Co.), 11 Bankr. 732 (Bankr. S.D.W. Va. 1981), order
partialy vacated on other grounds, 27 Bankr. 980 (S.D.W. Va. 1983); In re Pacific
Sunwest Printing, 6 Bankr. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980); Adelman v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp. (In re Tulsa Port Warehouse Co., Inc.), 4 Bankr. 801 (D.N.D. Okla.
1980); United Gen. Leasing, Inc. v. Gherke Enters., Inc. (In re Gherke Enters., Inc.),
1 Bankr. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979); Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 11 (1977).
47. The historical and revision notes to 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) indicate that the
intended exception to continuation of a security interest occurs when value is added
by the estate to collateral; for example, where raw materials are converted to inven-
tory, or inventory to accounts, at a cost to the estate. The secured creditor is not to
receive a windfall at the expense of unsecured creditors.
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of their interests.4 8 However, failure to make payments after
filing of the petition does not by itself constitute cause for
relief.49
The concept of adequate protection, as provided by sec-
tion 361, means that regardless of whether the secured credi-
tor is undersecured or oversecured on the date of filing, his
position should not deteriorate simply because the automatic
stay is imposed, such that he suffers a loss of property or the
benefit of his bargain. This rule of law is based upon the
fifth amendment's constitutional prohibition against depri-
vation of property without due process.5 0  The benchmark
for determining whether one is adequately protected is the
value of the lien rather than the amount of the debt as of the
date of filing.-"
When determining the necessity of protecting the credi-
tor's position, the courts often speak in terms of whether an
"equity cushion" exists. This concept, sometimes also called
a "value cushion," is based upon a measurement of equity in
the property available to protect the interest of the secured
creditor from diminution of the collateral through deprecia-
48. See, e.g., Duggan v. Highland-First Ave. Corp., 25 Bankr. 955 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1982). The court may scrutinize prefiling conduct of the debtor, and search for
so-called "badges" of bad faith, such as the transfer of property to a shell corporation
or the lack of unsecured creditors. See also North Cent. Dev. Co. v. Landmark Capi-
tal Co. (In re Landmark Capital Co.), 27 Bankr. 273 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1983); In re
Nikron, Inc., 27 Bankr. 773 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Madison Hotel Assocs.,
29 Bankr. 1003 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982);.In re Victory Constr. Co., Inc., 9 Bankr. 549
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981). However, the courts will generally uphold a filing if grounds
for a reorganization and the need for protection are deemed to exist. See, e.g., Bar-
clays Bank of N.Y., N.A. v. Saypol (In re Saypol), 31 Bankr. 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Pelzer (In re Pelzer), 15 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1981). An excellent discussion of this question is provided in Ordin, The
Good Faith Princile in the Bankruptcy Code: A Case Study, 38 Bus. LAW. 1795
(1983).
49. In re Household Fin. Corp. v. Adams (In re Adams), 27 Bankr. 582 (D. Del.
1983). Failure to make payments may have the effect of "eating away" at the equity
cushion, as interest accrues on the principal balance of the claim under I I U.S.C.
§ 506(b) (1982).
50. See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940); Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); 11 U.S.C. § 361 historical and
revision notes (1982);
51. In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982) (no right to protection ofjunior liens); Bankers Life Ins. Co. of Neb. v. Alyucan
Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981); 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
1984]
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tion or depletion (for example, consumption of inventory in
the debtor's business operations without adequate replace-
ment) during the reorganization. For this purpose, only the
moving party's lien, rather than senior or junior liens, is rele-
vant.52 However, the courts have held that even where there
is an equity cushion, if it is declining and is likely to be elim-
inated, the debtor may still be ordered to provide adequate
protection, as a quidpro quo for continuation of the stay.53
The Code does not precisely define the measure of valua-
tion to be considered by the courts. 4 The drafters' com-
ments indicate that this ambiguity was purposely intended
by Congress in order to allow flexibility to determine the is-
sue on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, a creditor is likely to
argue for the employment of liquidation or forced sale value
on the theory that the court should consider what the credi-
tor may recover if ultimately forced to repossess the collat-
eral following unsuccessful reorganization attempts.
As with other cases where valuation is at issue, the court
may consider evidence such as offers to purchase and the
testimony of the owner to determine whether a party is ade-
quately protected. However, the testimony of a qualified ap-
praiser is generally required. This testimony is necessary
because the amount of the lien against the property is sel-
dom at issue and, therefore, the value of the property is usu-
ally the focus in such proceedings. A party is not estopped
from employing one measure of valuation at one stage in the
proceedings and a different one at a later stage. Valuation
of a claim as of the date of filing may be determined by
means of a motion brought by the debtor or creditor at any
52. An excellent discussion of this concept, and of the means of determining eq-
uity for adequate protection purposes as opposed to the alternative ground for relief
from stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982), is provided in La Jolla Mortgage Fund
v. Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
53. See, e.g., id. at 288. A minority of courts have taken the position that a
secured creditor is entitled to preservation of the status quo during the reorganization
proceedings, including the amount of any equity cushion which exists on the date of
filing. Cf. Sanders v. Tucker (In re Tucker), 5 Bankr. 180, 183 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980) (collateral to debt ratio must be considered).
54. The value of the collateral is the amount to be realized "from the most com-
mercially reasonable disposition practicable under the circumstances." Schiavoni v.
Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. (In re Schiavoni), 19 Bankr. 51, 52 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982) (Chapter 13).
55. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 506.04[l], at 506-18 (3rd ed. 1984).
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stage in the proceedings. 6 A creditor may also argue that a
debtor, based upon past behavior, will not protect its collat-
eral; therefore, the court should disregard the legal fiction
that the debtor in possession is a distinct entity. Under ap-
propriate circumstances, it may even request appointment of
a trustee under section 1104(a).
There is no time limit for bringing a motion for relief
from stay. However, after considering the risks and benefits
of foregoing action in the short term and the chance of a
successful request for relief, a creditor is well-advised to seek
immediate relief to protect its position. When deciding the
question of adequate protection, the court may consider
means of protecting the creditor's interest proposed by the
parties, including personal guarantees and mortgages offered
by corporate principals. While the Code suggests types of
protection under section 36 1,57 the list is not exclusive.
Under the doctrine of marshaling of assets, a creditor may
be forced to move against the debtor's principals prior to ob-
taining relief from stay. 8
3. Preservation of Cash Collateral
Under section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, a credi-
tor may also seek to obtain "cash collateral" as protection.
Section 363(a) defines the term "cash collateral" as including
proceeds of collateral in which the estate and another entity
have an interest, including postpetition proceeds of prepeti-
tion collateral under section 552. Section 363(c)(2) prohibits
use of cash collateral by the debtor in possession without an
order from the court or consent of the creditor, while section
363(4) requires the debtor to segregate and account for the
cash collateral.59 A creditor may use these requirements as a
lever with which to bargain with the debtor for the creditor's
consent to use of the cash collateral.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982)
57. Id § 102(3). See also id § 361 historical and revision notes.
58. Cf. In re Multiple Servs. Indus., Inc., 18 Bankr. 635 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982)
(trustee's motion in Chapter 7 granted; bank ordered to marshall security to preserve
assets for unsecured creditors).
59. Prepetition consent will not suffice. In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co.,
16 Bankr. 750, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Despite this clear prohibition against the use of cash col-
lateral, the debtor is unlikely to apply to the court for per-
mission to use cash collateral and risk losing by bringing the
issue to the attention of the creditor. Typically, the debtor
needs to use cash generated by accounts receivable to remain
in business, especially if poor cash flow was a precipitating
factor in filing, since suppliers usually force the debtor in
possession to operate on a C.O.D. basis. Recognizing this
reality, and that spent cash cannot be replaced and its pro-
ceeds cannot be easily traced, the drafters placed these broad
prohibitions and protections in the Code.
Time may be of the essence to a creditor concerned with
possible depletion of cash collateral. A debtor who is losing
money may be tempted to deplete inventory and cash from
accounts receivable by using them in its business operations
at a continued loss. The risk to the debtor is not great, as the
Code fails to back such prohibitions with clear sanctions for
a violation. Therefore, a cautious creditor should request an
immediate court order enjoining use of cash collateral with-
out an accounting and, as suggested by the list of possibili-
ties in section 361, seek adequate protection through either a
provision for replacement of the security, a superior lien, or
cash payments. Once cash collateral is gone, there is seldom
any recourse or remedy left for the creditor.6 °
In determining whether to continue the stay, the court
will take into account the debtor's need to use such collateral
to effect a reorganization, the Code's policy favoring reor-
ganization whenever possible, and the creditors need to pro-
tect his collateral.61 A court may condition continuing the
stay on: payments under section 361(1); provision of addi-
60. See, e.g., In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 Bankr. 720 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1982); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 Bankr. 617 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982); In re
Cormarc, Inc., 16 Bankr. 551 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Inre Prime, Inc., 15 Bankr. 216
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). At least one court has held that a bank holding cash collat-
eral in a checking account may freeze the account in order to protect the collateral.
See Gazelle, 17 Bankr. at 620. However, a creditor does so at the risk of being found
in violation of the stay or liable to the debtor for wrongful dishonor of checks under
U.C.C. § 4-402 (1981). But see Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 Bankr. 810 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1983) (placement of administrative hold on debtor's checking account violated
automatic stay in Chapter 13 case).
61. See Sun Bank/Suncoast v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite, Inc.), 9 Bankr.
440, 443 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
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tional or replacement liens under section 361(2); secured
personal guarantees of third parties; or, relief other than the
granting of administrative status under section 503(b)-gen-
erally considered unreliable protection. This last alternative
must result in realization of the undefined "indubitable
equivalent 62 of the creditor's interest.63 A secured creditor
should therefore consider exerting the leverage afforded by
the Code in order to obtain as adequate protection a per-
fected security interest in the debtor in possession's postpeti-
tion accounts receivable.
4. Relief from Stay of Acts Against Property: Lack of
Equity and Necessity for Effective Reorganization
Code section 362(d)(2) provides an alternative ground
for relief from the automatic stay, specifically with respect to
an act against property. The statute provides that the court
may grant such relief if the debtor has no equity in the prop-
erty and the property is not necessary to an effective reor-
ganization. The burden of proving lack of equity is upon the
moving party. The burden for proving all remaining
grounds for continuing the stay under section 363(d)(2) is
upon the debtor.64
In determining the question of equity for this purpose,
the court will aggregate all liens against the property, not
only those of the moving party.65 Since the amount of the
claim or lien against the property is usually not at issue
under section 506(a), the value of the collateral is again typi-
cally the central issue in such proceedings.
62. In re Griffiths, 27 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Patel, 21 Bankr.
101, 103 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982).
63. For examples of cases involving adequate protection of cash collateral, see
supra notes 60-61. See also K.L. Smith Enters., Ltd. v. United Bank of Denver Nat'l
Ass'n (In re K.L. Smith Enters., Ltd.), 2 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980); In re
Inforex, Inc., 10 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g) (1982). Although the burden is on the debtor to show
good faith, in practice the courts require the moving party to establish a prima facie
case of lack of good faith in the filing of the petition. See Ordin, supra note 48, at
1841.
65. La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assoc., 18 Bankr. 283, 290
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); State Employees' Retirement Fund v. Gardner (In re Gard-
ner), 14 Bankr. 455, 456 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). But see Central Fla. Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Spring Garden Foliage, Inc. (In re Spring Garden Foliage, Inc.), 15 Bankr.,
140, 143 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
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In considering the use of section 362(d)(2) as an alterna-
tive basis for relief, a court may look at whether there are
substitutes for the property such as leased equipment or ve-
hicles. However, the court is not limited to considering the
debtor's need for the property. Courts have held that inher-
ent in the question of an effective reorganization is whether
there is any prospect for a viable reorganization in the first
place. 6 Thus, they may examine such factors as whether the
debtor is capable of obtaining supplies necessary for ongoing
operations, whether business operations have irrevocably
ceased, whether the debtor has maintained sufficient clien-
tele to continue in business, the extent of the debtor's assets
and cash flow, its incurring of substantial postpetition debts,
continuing losses, and excessive administrative expenses
which will be incurred in liquidating under a plan of reor-
ganization rather than under Chapter 7 of the Code.67 A
court may be more lenient toward the debtor on this issue,
depending upon the stage in the proceedings when the ques-
tion is raised. Because of the flexibility afforded by Code
section 361, a creditor may also request that the court condi-
tion continuation of the stay upon the debtor's filing of a
plan by a certain date.
A finding on both elements is necessary to receive relief
under section 362(d)(2). A court may continue the stay even
if the estate has no equity in the property, if the property is
necessary for reorganization. It should be recognized that
time may be of the essence both to avoid harm to the collat-
eral and to convince the court of the gravity of the situation
and of the irrevocable harm to the creditor's interests if the
reorganization is allowed to proceed without the granting of
relief. Because of the court's tendency to give a nascent re-
organization the benefit of the doubt,68 prospects of success
may appear dim for the creditor. However, it is still in the
creditor's interest to attempt to obtain relief since this may
increase the credibility of the creditor if a renewal of the mo-
66. See, e.g., In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 Bankr. 617, 620 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982).
67. See, e.g., Standard Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago v. Phelps (In re Chat-
man), 23 Bankr. 176 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
68. One court refers to this policy as "the rehabilitative ideal." In re Barrington
Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 BANKR. 952, 964 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (footnote omit-
ted). See also supra note 30.
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tion for relief is made with the court. The secured party may
also be entitled to a super-priority position under Code sec-
tion 507(b) if the court in retrospect determines that the ade-
quate protection given or found as required by section 362
was actually insufficient to prevent harm to the creditor's
position.
A creditor with a claim to most of the assets of the debtor
may decide that the burden of establishing insufficient eq-
uity is easier to meet with regard to obtaining relief from
stay than the burden it faces in either establishing grounds
for a dismissal of the debtor's petition or conversion to a
Chapter 7 proceeding.69 Furthermore, a creditor considering
moving for relief from stay must also consider that failure to
act in a timely fashion may result in subsequent actions prej-
udicial to its interests, from both the debtor and other credi-
tors, such as a later dismissal or conversion.
B. Procedure for Obtaining Relieffrom Stay Under
Section 362 of the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules
Under Bankruptcy Rule 4001, relief from stay is sought
through a motion filed with the court. A responsive pleading
is unnecessary. 70 Service must be made on the debtor in pos-
session and such persons as the court directs.7' Typically,
such notice is given to all interested parties, including the
debtor's attorney and the holders of all other liens on the
property, which may include federal, state and local tax au-
thorities. Service of all notices may be made by first class
mail unless otherwise indicated by the rules.72
In a unique provision, the Code in section 102(1) permits
the court to grant an interested party relief without a hearing
assuming there is no objection. Unless otherwise specified in
the Code, section 102(l)(A) provides that there must be such
notice and opportunity to request a hearing as is "appropri-
ate in the particular circumstances." While length of notice
is not specified, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin has indicated that in the ordinary case,
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982).
70. BANKR. R.P. 4001, 9013-9014.
71. BANKR. R.P. 9013.
72. BANKR. R.P. 7004(b).
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fifteen days should be allowed for filing objections and re-
quests for hearing.7 3 If the need for relief is considered ur-
gent, a hearing date may be obtained and a notice of motion
may be served which announces the date of the hearing
rather than merely the opportunity for a hearing.
Under section 362(e), the court may hold either a prelim-
inary or a final hearing at which evidence may be taken.
The court may continue the stay after determining at the
preliminary hearing that the party opposing relief has a rea-
sonable probability of prevailing on the motion at the final
hearing. Thus the court will look for the presence of factual
issues such as valuation of the collateral, perfection of the
security interest, the existence of adequate protection, or
other legal issues which cannot be properly determined at
the preliminary hearing. Absent a waiver of these deadlines
by the parties, 4 the court must grant the requested relief
within thirty days of the motion, or schedule a final hearing
within thirty days of the preliminary hearing.
The bankruptcy rules provide for exparte relief from the
stay under certain specified limited circumstancesY.7  After
relief is granted the moving party must immediately give
oral notice to the debtor in possession and ensure that it ob-
tains copies of the order granting relief. The adverse party
may then appear and move for reinstatement of the stay on
two days notice to the party obtaining relief.
The rules provide for discovery in adversary proceed-
ings.76 Therefore, time permitting, the secured party may
wish to employ interrogatories or depositions to establish
value, use and protection of the collateral, its location, and
the possibility or probability of a successful reorganization.
73. This requirement is promulgated by the bankruptcy court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin and can be found in "Notice of Change in Procedure for Seek-
ing Relief from the Automatic Stay and for Lien Avoidance under Section 522(f),"
paragraph 3.b.
74. See BANKR. R.P. 4001(b).
75. See BANKR. R.P. 4001(c). The moving party must show that immediate and
irreparable harm will occur before there is a chance for the adverse party or his or her
attorney to be heard. The movant's attorney must also certify to the court in writing
the efforts, if any, which have been made to give notice, as well as reasons why further
notice should not be required.
76. See BANKR. R.P. 7026-7037 (these rules make specified sections of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure applicable).
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While the Code does not provide the applicable standard of
proof, it would seem that in the normal case involving valua-
tion, the proper standard would be the ordinary civil burden
of establishing the facts by a clear preponderance of the evi-
dence. When fraud or bad faith is alleged as "cause," the
middle standard of clear and convincing evidence would ar-
guably apply.
Under Code section 554(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 6007, a
party moving for relief from stay on the basis of lack of eq-
uity may also join with its motion, a motion to direct the
debtor in possession to abandon the property to the debtor.
The basis for such a motion is that the property is of incon-
sequential value or is burdensome to the estate. If success-
ful, the property is "abandoned" and reverts to the
possession of the debtor. The secured party can then com-
mence or continue the appropriate steps to foreclose on the
assets and obtain possession of the collateral.
V. CREDITOR PROBES AND POSTURING: EXERTING
PRESSURE ON THE DEBTOR TO DETERMINE THE
PROBABILITIES OF SUCCESS AND CONCESSION
A. Motion For Adequate Protection
Before the debtor in possession may continue the auto-
matic stay, 7 use, sell or lease property outside of the ordi-
nary course of business, use cash collateral78 or obtain credit
in return for certain specified types of consideration,79 the
Code requires that the creditor's interest in property of the
estate be protected. Rather than moving for relief from stay,
a creditor concerned about depreciation or depletion of its
collateral during the reorganization proceedings may move
that specific types of adequate protection be provided by the
debtor if such protection is available. The burden is upon
the creditor to demonstrate that its interests are not ade-
quately protected. A controversy exists, however, over
whether a creditor may receive compensation as adequate
protection for the delay in use of its property. The compen-
77. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1982).
78. Id. § 363(c)(2).
79. Id. § 364.
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sation would be measured by the income the creditor could
have earned from the property's use if it were free from the
restrictions of the bankruptcy proceedings. 80
B. Relieffor Breach of the Debtor's Duty to File
Financial Reports
Code section 704(7) and Bankruptcy Rule 2015 require
that the debtor in possession as trustee file periodic financial
statements with the court, including statements of receipts
and disbursements, and any other information which the
court demands. Creditors should monitor such reports in or-
der to uncover warning signs of a debtor's worsening eco-
nomic position or a diversion of assets through use, sale or
lease outside the ordinary course of business without court
authorization. Failure to file such a report may be a clear
warning of worsening business conditions or poor bookkeep-
ing practices. It may also constitute grounds for dismissal,
conversion, or appointment of a trustee or examiner.8 1
C. Collateral Assault on the Debtor: Enforcement of
Personal Guarantees
Although not strictly within the scope of the bankruptcy
proceedings, a secured party with a personal guarantee by
the principals of a corporate or partnership debtor may con-
sider independent enforcement of such guarantees. The
creditor's motivation may be both to recover on the guaran-
tees and to exert additional leverage on the debtor, albeit
indirectly, in order to receive cooperation in the bankruptcy
proceedings. The creditor must also be aware of the poten-
tial for driving the individual into a personal bankruptcy as
80. Compare United Va. Bank v. Virginia Foundry Co., Inc. (In re Virginia
Foundry Co., Inc.), 9 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.
Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4 Bankr. 635 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980) (undersecured creditor entitled to relief from the stay because of loss
of use of its money during reorganization), with In re Pine Lake Village Apartment
Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1982) (protection is directly related to preserva-
tion of collateral value, not to compensation for loss of business opportunity); Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mariner Indus., Inc.),
10 Bankr. 711 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
81. See In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 22 Bankr. 668, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1982); Paccar Fin. Corp. v. Pappas (In re Pappas), 17 Bankr. 662, 667-69 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1982). Such delays are characteristic of a reorganization.
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well. While the general rule is that the automatic stay does
not bar actions against third parties who have not filed in
bankruptcy, under certain circumstances the court may en-
join such proceedings under its general equitable powers,
particularly when the debtor can show that defending
against a collateral action will impair efforts to rehabilitate.82
D. Removing the Debtor: Appointment of a Trustee or
Examiner
Under section 1104(a), the court may order appointment
of a trustee for cause at any time before confirmation of a
plan, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing. Cause is defined as, but is not limited to, fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the
affairs of the debtor by current management. In the alterna-
tive, the court may order appointment of a trustee if the ap-
pointment is in the best interest of the creditors, any equity
holders or any interest of the estate. The court may make
such appointment only on the request of a party in interest,
not sua sponte.83 The burden of proof is upon the moving
party.84
In evaluating the interests of the parties, the court may
look at continued losses, preferences, transactions with re-
lated entities, depletion of the estate or postpetition transfer
of assets without permission. In determining whether to
grant the motion, courts primarily weigh the need for pro-
tecting creditors and other interested parties against the costs
and expenses of appointment.85 The statute also provides
for appointment of an examiner under certain
circumstances.
82. See Lahman Mfg. Co., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Aberdeen (In re Lahman
Mfg. Co., Inc.), 33 Bankr. 681 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983) (enjoining suit against corporate
debtor's guarantors); Herman Hassinger, Inc. v. Derkotch (In re Herman Hassinger,
Inc.), 20 Bankr. 517 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Alan I.W. Frank Corp. v. P.M.A., Inc. (In
re Alan I.W. Frank Corp.), 19 Bankr. 41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); 11 U.S.C. § 105
(1982).
83. In re Mandalay Shores Coop. Housing Ass'n, 22 Bankr. 202, 207 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1982).
84. In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 Bankr. 155, 159 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
85. See, e.g., In re Table Talk, Inc., 22 Bankr. 706 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re
Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 Bankr. 830 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
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E. Pulling the Plug: Conversion or Dismissal
of the Proceeding
Code Section 1112(b) provides for conversion to a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation or dismissal of Chapter 11 proceedings for
cause, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing.86
This section lists several examples of "cause" and in-
cludes, inter alia: (1) continuing loss to or diminution of the
estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabili-
tation; or (2) inability to effectuate a plan.87 Grounds for
dismissal or conversion may also include the bad faith of the
debtor 88 or lack of authority to file the petition in bank-
ruptcy.8 9 Generally, the likelihood of success on such a mo-
tion is greater at a later stage in the proceedings, when
inability to effectuate a plan is more evident and the court is
less likely to give the debtor further breathing space in which
to devise a plan. If in fact the case is converted, counsel
should be alert to requirements under Chapter 7 which may
not apply in the Chapter 11 proceeding.90
F Objections to Authority Necessary to Continue Business
Operations Use, Sale or Lease of Property, and
Obtaining Credit
Code Section 363(c) provides that, with the exception of
cash collateral, the debtor may use, sell or lease property of
the estate in the ordinary course of business without court
authorization. This section grants unimpeded authority to
use and dispose, in the ordinary course of business, property
86. If the debtor is a former or an eleemosynary institution, the court cannot
convert the case to Chapter 7 without a request by the debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1112(c) (1982).
87. In re K.C. March Co., 12 Bankr. 401 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
88. See, e.g., In re Spenard Ventures, Inc., 18 Bankr. 164 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1982). See also In re E. Paul Kovacs and Co., Inc., 16 Bankr. 203 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981) (conversion justified where debtor was oblivious of fiduciary duties); cases cited
supra note 48.
89. See, e.g.,In re JP Enters., 22 Bankr. 661 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Acous-
tic Fiber Sound Systems, 20 Bankr. 769 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); In re Autumn Press,
Inc., 20 Bankr. 60 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
90. For example, under Chapter 7, an undersecured creditor must file a proof of
claim within 90 days of the Section 341 meeting, or risk loss of payments for the
deficiency. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982); BANKR. R.P. 3002.
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which has been pledged as collateral. In all other cases, the
trustee must first obtain court permission, after notice and a
hearing.91 Further, the debtor may use, sell or lease property
outside the ordinary course of business notwithstanding any
liens if applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of the
property, the creditor consents, the sale price is greater than
the aggregate of all hens, the lien is in bona fide dispute, or
the creditor can be compelled to accept a money satisfaction
of its interest. 92 In such cases the creditor's lien attaches to
the proceeds of the sale.
Under section 364, the debtor may also obtain unsecured
credit in the ordinary course of business without court au-
thorization. If credit cannot be so obtained, with court per-
mission the debtor may seek to invoke a series of
increasingly burdensome measures to secure the bankruptcy
lender. These measures include providing a lien on unen-
cumbered assets, providing the lender with a priority claim
under section 507, or providing a senior lien on collateral if
the present secured creditor is given adequate protection.93
G. The Case of the Land Contract Chameleon: Executory
Contract or Security Interest?
Protecting the interest of a vendor on a land contract,
also sometimes known as an installment land sale contract
or contract for deed, provides a special situation in bank-
ruptcy. Many courts have held that such contracts are in
fact executory contracts and as such are subject to Code sec-
tion 365. 91 If so, the contract cannot be assumed by the
debtor in possession with court approval unless the debtor
first cures any defaults or provides adequate assurance of
91. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1982).
92. Id. § 363(f). The cost of the sale may be satisfied out of the property and the
creditor's lien. Id. § 506(c). See also In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1982).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1982). The debtor has the burden of showing adequate
protection. Id. § 364(d)(2).
94. See, e.g., Hall v. Perry (In re Cochise College Park, Inc.), 703 F.2d 1339 (9th
Cir. 1982); Benevides v. Alexander (In re Alexander), 670 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982); In
re New York Investors Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); The Record
Co., Inc. v. Bummbusiness, Inc. (In re The Record Co., Inc.), 8 Bankr. 57 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1980). See generally Epling, Treatment of Land Sales Contracts Under the
New Bankruptcy Code, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 853; Levy, Bankruptcy and the Land Sales
Contract, 23 CASE W. REs. 393 (1972).
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prompt curing of such defaults, and further provides ade-
quate assurance of future performance under the contract. 95
On request of a party in interest, the debtor may be com-
pelled by the court to elect to assume or reject the contract
within a specified time.96 If rejected, the vendor is allowed
to proceed against the property and is given an unsecured
claim for damages caused by such rejection.97
Determining whether the contract is executory depends
on state law and the degree of the debtor's performance to
date under the agreement.98 For example, if all payments
have been made and all that remains is for the vendor to
tender the deed, a court is more likely to construe the con-
tract as executed and as constituting security for perform-
ance of the agreement, similar to a mortgage. The court may
also consider the equities of the situation in determining
whether to grant relief from the stay, including the loss of
equity in the property during the reorganization proceed-
ings, any adverse impact upon other creditors if relief is
granted, and the likelihood of a successful reorganization.
VI. FINAL STAGE: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION?
The ultimate goal of any reorganization proceeding is to
obtain court confirmation of a plan of reorganization which
restructures the debts of the debtor. The Code provides a
limited period in which the debtor has the exclusive right to
file a plan, after which any interested party may file a plan.
For the secured creditor, the importance of this provision is
not the possibility of obtaining dismissal or conversion, for
the purpose of this initial period is to allow for exclusivity
and not to set a strict deadline. Rather, this section provides
the creditor with leverage to exert pressure on the debtor by
threatening to file his own plan, including a plan of
95. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1982).
96. Id. § 365(d)(2); BANKR. R.P. 6006.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g), (j) (1982). Special provisions apply to protect the pur-
chaser when the debtor is the seller. Id. § 365(i).
98. See, e.g., In re Patch Graphics, 32 Bankr. 373 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re
Cox, 28 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); In re Soter, 26 Bankr. 838 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1983); Empire Enters., Inc. v. Koopmans (In re Koopmans), 22 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. D.




A. Approval of the Disclosure Statement
The debtor must obtain court approval of a written dis-
closure statement prior to submitting a plan to the creditors
for balloting. The debtor must transmit a disclosure state-
ment to each creditor before solicitating approval of a plan.
The court may approve a disclosure statement without a val-
uation or appraisal of the debtor's assets. The court must
first determine, however, after notice and a hearing, whether
the disclosure statement which serves as a prospectus con-
tains adequate information. This is defined by the Code as
sufficient information under the circumstances and in light
of the debtor's nature and history and condition of its books
to "enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of the
holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an
informed judgment about the plan."'0 Typically a disclo-
sure statement will include a history of the debtor's opera-
tions, including the events which led to the filing in
bankruptcy, a description of the bankruptcy plan and an at-
tempt to persuade the particular class that it is in that class'
interest to vote for the plan. Different disclosure statements
may be provided to different classes of claims.
A secured creditor may object to approval of a disclosure
statement. 10' The hearing on the disclosure statement may
be used to obtain information on treatment of other secured
parties and to force disclosure of information which a credi-
tor deems necessary in order to determine whether to vote
for the plan.
B. Classification and Treatment of Claims Under the Plan
of Reorganization
The Code divides claims or interests into those which are
impaired under a proposed plan and those which are not.
Section 1124 defines when a claim has been impaired. Gen-
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (1982). See also supra note 12.
100. Id. § 1125(a).
101. BANKR. R.P. 3016-3017. For examples of rejection of disclosure statement
as unsatisfactory, see In re Fierman, 21 Bankr. 314 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), and In re
East Redley Corp., 16 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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erally, a claim is impaired when the plan proposes to alter
the legal, equitable and contractual rights of the creditor.
Conversely, a claim is unimpaired by a proposed plan if the
plan reverses any acceleration by curing defaults, reinstates
the original maturity of claims and compensates for damages
resulting from the default, or if the plan cashes out the
claims of the class. The major significance of claims being
labeled unimpaired is that an unimpaired class of creditors
is generally deemed to have voted for the plan.10 2 This may
have significant consequences for the debtor in determining
whether the plan has been accepted by the requisite number
of creditors and classes.
An outline of the contents of a plan of reorganization is
contained in section 1123 of the Code. The plan must desig-
nate particular classes of claims. Each such claim must be
placed in a particular class only if it "is substantially similar
to the other claims or interests of such class."'' 0 3 Further, the
debtor cannot discriminate between the creditors in each
class with respect to the treatment of the claims unless the
holder of a claim agrees to less favorable treatment) °4
A plan must also provide for adequate means for its exe-
cution, such as retention by the debtor of property of the
estate, transfer of property of the estate, transfer of property
to other entities, merger or consolidation, or sale of all or
any part of the property. 05 The debtor may also propose to
satisfy or modify a lien, cure or waive a default, extend a
maturity date or change an interest rate, 10 6 notwithstanding
any acceleration or "ipso facto" clause. Creditors must care-
fully scrutinize the plan's provisions in order to determine
whether it is feasible. Beyond this skeletal framework, the
Code provides the debtor with great flexibility in devising a
plan.
102. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1982). But see Buffalo Say. Bank v. Mar-
ston Enters., Inc., (In re Marston Enters., Inc.), 13 Bankr. 514, 519-20 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981) (presumption of acceptance by unimpaired class may be rebutted by
affirmative act of rejection).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a)(1982). See 11 U.S.C. 1123(1) (1982). See also In re Pine
Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (debtor may not
engage in "gamesmanship" in order to create an accepting class of claims).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1982).




The plan may be modified at any time before confirma-
tion.107 The provision for modification allows the possibility
of negotiated treatment in a plan. Often the debtor will cir-
culate a proposed plan with a proposed or approved disclo-
sure statement in order to solicit comments and to "test the
waters" before putting the plan to a final vote. This testing
minimizes the risk of rejection of the debtor's plan and the
acceptance of a creditor's plan, or even dismissal or conver-
sion. Circulation of a disclosure statement is therefore fre-
quently the initial stage of negotiation of treatment of
various creditors under the plan, in what is typically a long
process of compromise. In the alternative, a series of plans
may be necessary before confirmation can be obtained.
C. Acceptance or Rejection of the Plan, Election Under
Section 1111(b), and Confirmation
Prior to implementation, the plan must be accepted by
the creditors and an order must be secured which confirms
the plan after notice and hearing.10 8 In order to conclude
that a class of "impaired" claims has accepted the plan, it
must be demonstrated that creditors who hold at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the
claims allowed by the court in each class have accepted the
plan. 0 9 This includes only creditors who actually voted.
Thus, it is in the debtor's interest to negotiate with creditors
in order to obtain their vote. Creditors are particularly sen-
sitive to receiving what they perceive to be fair treatment of
their claims not only within classes but among secured credi-
tors within differing classes. Therefore, a plan which pro-
poses less advantageous treatment of a creditor's particular
interest as opposed to similarly situated creditors belonging
to different classes is likely to be vigorously opposed by some
or all such creditors.
Code section 1129 provides a list of requirements which
must be met before the court can confirm a plan. In order to
determine the proper treatment of a secured creditor, one
107. Id § 1127; BANKR. R.P. 3019.
108. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1128 (1982); BANKR. R.P. 3018, 3020.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c). The court may void a rejection which is not in good
faith. See id § 1126(e).
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must first determine the value of its secured claim under sec-
tion 506(a). If the creditor was undersecured as of the date
of filing, its claim will ordinarily be bifurcated into two
claims - secured and unsecured. If the debtor chooses to
contest the valuation of a secured claim, which would if suc-
cessful create a large unsecured claim, the debtor risks alien-
ating that creditor. As a result, it may be unable to procure
the requisite number of votes in favor of the plan from the
class of unsecured creditors. 10 Typically, the debtor will
count on obtaining the votes of at least the class of un-
secured creditors by convincing them that they will receive a
more favorable distribution under the proposed plan than
they would in the event of a liquidation.
In arguing the value of its secured claim, a secured credi-
tor must keep in mind that if the claim is oversecured under
section 506(b), it may also be entitled to receive interest and
attorneys fees under its contract with the debtor to the extent
the claim is oversecured.
The Code again demonstrates its built-in flexibility with
regard to valuation of a secured claim since it does not pro-
vide what measure of valuation should be employed at this
particular point in the reorganization proceedings. Thus, the
creditor who initially argued for use of liquidation value on
a motion for adequate protection may later argue for use of
a higher going concern or fair market value if the reorga-
nized debtor seeks to continue use of the property in its reor-
ganized business operations. In the words of the Code, the
"value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the val-
uation and of the proposed disposition or use of such prop-
erty.""' The question of valuation in most large
reorganization questions is resolved through negotiations in
light of the uncertainty of the outcome of a court decision 1 2
and the inherent risks for all concerned.
110. See BANKR. R.P. 3018(d). In addition, "if the holder of the unsecured defi-
ciency claim votes against the plan, the class of unsecured claims must be paid in full
before old equity can receive anything" under section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Broude,
Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39
Bus. LAw. 441, 447 (1984).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
112. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 506.04, at 506-22 n.5 (3d ed. 1983).
[Vol. 67:421
REPRESENTING SECURED CREDITORS
Under the "best interest" test, 1 3 each holder of a claim
or interest in a claim must have either accepted the plan or
received or retained property not lower in value than the
creditor would have received if the debtor liquidated under
Chapter 7 on the effective date of the plan. An alternative to
this provision is available for a secured creditor. Code Sec-
tion 111 l(b)(1)(A) provides that a secured creditor may be
treated as a recourse creditor, regardless of its contractual or
state law rights. The intention is to allow the creditor to ob-
tain the benefit of any increases in the value of the collateral
which secures its claim, so that it may receive the full
amount of its claim during the life of the plan."14
Section 111 l(b)(2) allows a class of secured creditors to
waive the recourse provision and choose, by means of a two-
thirds vote, to waive any unsecured deficiency under section
506(a) and to be treated as fully secured under the plan."15
The election is not available where the collateral is to be sold
under the plan or section 363.116 The election may have seri-
ous consequences for the debtor, and affords additional lev-
erage to the secured creditor. In order to be left unimpaired
under section 1124, an electing creditor must receive the
present cash payment of its entire claim, secured and un-
secured portions alike. If the creditor is impaired, and it
votes against the plan, its objection may be overcome only if
certain requirements are met by the plan.' 17
Thus, under section 1129(a)(7)(B), an undersecured cred-
itor who has made the section 1111 (b)(2) election to be
treated as a fully secured creditor must receive property
under the plan with a present value at least equal to the
creditor's interest in the collateral, and totaling the full
amount of its claim. If, for example, a claim for $100,000 is
secured by collateral worth $50,000, the creditor must re-
113. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1982).
114. Kaplan, Nonrecourse Undersecured Creditors Under New Chapter 11 and
The Section 1111(b) Election: Already A Need For Change, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269,
270 (1979) (citing 124 Cong. Rec. HIll05 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)).
115. The election must be made before approval of the disclosure statement, or at
such time as the court allows. BANKR. R.P. 3014. See generally Broude, supra note
110, at 447.
116. Crocker Nat'l Bank v. American Mariner Indus., Inc. (In re American Mari-
ner Indus., Inc.), 10 Bankr. 711, 713 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981).
117. See generally Kaplan, supra note 114, at 270; Broude, supra note 110.
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ceive payments over the life of the plan totaling at least the
allowed amount of the claim ($100,000), with a present value
equal to the value of its collateral ($50,000 plus interest dur-
ing the plan).
D. "Cram-Down" of Dissenting Creditors
Ordinarily, to obtain confirmation, each class must have
accepted the plan under the requirement set forth in section
1126, or must be left unimpaired under section 1124.118
However, an exception is provided for a so-called "cram-
down" of a dissenting class of creditors by the court, if cer-
tain prerequisites are met. Under section 1129(b)(1), a court
may confirm the plan regardless of dissenting classes if at
least one class other than insiders has accepted the plan and
the plan is fair and equitable to those classes of claims that
are impaired and have not accepted the plan. Insiders in-
clude classes deemed to have accepted the plan under sec-
tion 1126(f) because their claims are unimpaired under
Section 1124.119
The Code specifically defines "fair and equitable" treat-
ment of secured creditors. Such creditors must first retain
their lien, "whether the property subject to such lien is re-
tained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the
extent of the allowed amount of such claim,"1 20 unless a sale
under section 363(k) is proposed, in which case the lien must
attach to the proceeds of the sale. In addition, each secured
creditor must "receive on account of such claim deferred
cash payments totalling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan," 121 at
least equal to the value of the creditor's interest in the es-
tate's interest in the property. In the alternative, the plan
must provide for the realization by the secured creditors of
the "indubitable equivalent" of their claims, a term which is
118. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982). The court may also reject a plan not pro-
posed in good faith. Id. § 1129(a)(3).
119. Id. at § 1129(a)(10). But see In re Pine Lake Village Apartments, 19 Bankr.
819, 829 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (at least one impaired class must affirmatively accept
the plan).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I), (ii) (1982).
121. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). See In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr.
653, 656-58 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
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not defined by the Code, and has seen few judicial interpre-
tations to date.122
In practice, when the debtor proposes periodic payments
to secured creditors over the life of the plan, the present
value of the deferred cash payments or income must be de-
termined in order to ascertain whether the creditor will real-
ize the present value of its interest. This rule is based upon
the time value of the money, and the fact that a creditor
could invest such funds and obtain a return on its investment
but for the imposition of the stay and of the bankruptcy
plan. Therefore, the debtor will typically propose payment
of the amount of the claim as principal with interest over the
life of the plan, possibly with a "balloon" payment of the
balance of principal and interest at the end of some specified
term.
The battle typically comes down to whether an appropri-
ate interest rate has been proposed by the debtor in its
plan. 23 For example, if a plan proposes deferred payments
totalling $100,000 to a secured creditor with an allowed
claim for the same amount secured by collateral of equal
value, it cannot be confirmed over the creditor's objection.
While the payments equal the amount of the claim, the pres-
ent value of $100,000 in deferred payments without interest
is less than the amount of the creditor's interest in the
collateral.
The Code does not define the measure of a proper dis-
count or interest rate. There is a dearth of cases defining
such interest rates under Chapter 11 of the Code. While
there are many decisions regarding the proper interest rate
in cases under Chapter 13, the relevance of these cases to a
major business reorganization is questionable. In addition,
it must be noted that the results of these cases vary widely. 124
In general, section 1129(b) requires that the appropriate dis-
122. See, e.g., In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Grif-
fiths, 27 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Patel, 21 Bankr. 101 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1982).
123. See generally Klee, All You Wanted to Know About Cramdown Under the
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).
124. See, e.g.,In re Patel, 21 Bankr. at 104-05 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Nite
Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 372-73 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re Benford, 14 Bankr.
157, 158-60 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981).
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count rate be based upon the risk, the term of the plan, and
market conditions. In addition, a court may consider "the
rehabilitative ideal" of the Code in seeking to uphold an in-
terest rate which makes the plan feasible. 125
In what appears to be the most logical reading of this
statute, at least one court has held that the rate of interest
should correspond to that which would be charged or ob-
tained by a creditor making a loan to a third party upon
terms similar to the duration, collateral and risk of the
"loan" proposed under the terms of the plan.1 26 Because of
the risk involved, the appropriate interest rate may be
greater than that applicable under the initial agreement or
the prevailing prime rate at the time of confirmation. Thus,
the secured creditor may show that a proposed interest rate
is unsatisfactory by submitting evidence as to the appropri-
ate interest rate which would be charged by other institu-
tional lenders. Another court has looked to the interest rate
charged by the Internal Revenue Service as a relevant factor
or benchmark in setting the discount rate. 27
Finally, regardless of whether the debtor is forced to in-
voke the cram-down provision, the court must determine if
the plan is feasible. Unless proposed in the plan, a plan may
not be confirmed if it is likely to be followed by liquidation,
or the need for further reorganization of the debtor or any
successor.2 8 In making this determination the courts will
consider:
(1) the adequacy of capital structure; (2) the earning power
of the business; (3) economic conditions; (4) the ability of
management; (5) the probability of continuation of the
same management; and (6) any other related matters which
may determine prospects of a sufficiently successful opera-
125. In re Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 Bankr. 952, 964-66 nn.30-31
(Bankr. D. Utah 1981). This case contains an excellent discussion of the problem of
selecting an appropriate interest rate. Id.
126. See In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 657-58 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1980).
127. See In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr. 367, 373 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1 1) (1982). See also In re Great N. Protective Servs.,
Inc., 19 Bankr. 802 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982).
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tion to enable performance of the provisions of the plan. 2 9
Another factor is whether the monthly net income is suffi-
cient to pay the carrying charges proposed under its treat-
ment of creditors. Good faith of the debtor is irrelevant if
the debtor cannot prove the plan is feasible. 30 Expert testi-
mony may be necessary to prove feasibility if challenged.1 3'
As a result of the uncertainties created by the Code's pro-
visions for "cram-down" and the ambiguity surrounding the
appropriate discount rate and valuation of collateral, the
debtor usually negotiates an agreement with its creditors in
the majority of cases in which plans are confirmed. 13 2 Ac-
cording to the generally recognized authority on this provi-
sion, this is not an unintended result. 133 Neither party
wishes to engage in a showdown in the bankruptcy court if
compromise is at all possible. Thus, a secured creditor must
be aware of both the positive and negative effects of these
provisions on his position, as they will affect his negotiating
posture with the debtor.
The initial burden of proof at a confirmation hearing
under section 1141 is upon the debtor. The objecting se-
cured creditor must be prepared to rebut a prima facie case
made by the debtor at such hearing.
Finally, confirmation does not divest the bankruptcy
court of continuing jurisdiction to supervise both the plan
and any distribution to creditors under the plan, or to make
whatever additional orders are necessary until issuance of a
final decree and closing of the case. 134 The case may be re-
opened and possibly dismissed or converted for grounds in-
cluding failure or inability to comply with the plan, 35 or a
change in the debtor's financial circumstances. The order of
confirmation may also be revoked if procured by fraud. 136
At the same time, the Code provides for postconfirmation
129. In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 659 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980)
(citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.02 (14th ed. 1978)). Accord in re Pine
Lake Village Apartment Co. 19 Bankr. 819, 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
130. In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653, 659 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980).
131. Broude, supra note 110, at 448.
132. Klee, supra note 123, at 133.
133. Id. at 134.
134. See 11 U.S.C. § 1142 (1982); BANKR. R.P. 3020(d), 3021-3022.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(7)-(8).
136. Id. § 1144.
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modification of the plan after notice and a hearing. 137
VII. CONCLUSION
The initial response of a secured creditor unfamiliar with
the Code's provisions for protection of its interest may be
one of despair. The creditor is typically used to thinking of
bankruptcy in terms of liquidation. Even when the creditor
comprehends the distinction between liquidation and reor-
ganization, it usually faces delays in realization upon its col-
lateral or the obligation which it secures. The prospect for a
restructuring of its claim also looms along with a delay in
the use of its money, a delay possibly without interest com-
pensation. Even after confirmation, in the majority of cases
it is by no means certain that the debtor will be able to ad-
here to the terms of its plan without some modification to
deal with unforeseen circumstances such as a change in the
business climate.
Secured parties must realize, however, that in many ways
the Code affords them the tools to protect their interests,
whether by seeking return of the collateral under a motion
for relief from stay, or by exerting pressure upon the debtor
in a variety of ways in order to ultimately reach an accepta-
ble negotiated treatment of its claim. Furthermore, the Code
affords a creditor a measure of accountability and control
through court supervision over use and disposition of collat-
eral which might otherwise be lacking. It also provides im-
mediate access to a forum equipped to deal with creditor-
debtor issues in an efficient manner, under a mandate to
make expeditious determinations. In fact, the creditor must
acknowledge that the ultimate outcome of the reorganization
proceedings may be beneficial to its interests. This is partic-
ularly true when the creditor is undersecured and elects to be
treated as a fully secured creditor, receiving payment of its
claim in full even though were the debtor to liquidate it
would receive only the lesser value of its collateral.
Thus the secured creditor may determine that it is not
necessarily opposed to the debtor's rehabilitation. The
seemingly insurmountable obstacles posed by the imposition
137. See id at § 1127(b).
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of the automatic stay and the likely impending delay during
the course of the reorganization are not inconquerable. In
many ways, they may work in favor of the creditor. Assum-
ing that it has a perfected lien, the creditor's interests are not
seriously jeopardized as long as it remains constantly vigi-
lant for signs of depletion or dissipatation of its collateral.
Thus the creditor must be cautious and on its guard, imme-
diately affecting an aggressive stance in negotiations with the
debtor, and exerting leverage and pressure wherever appro-
priate to obtain a beneficial result, while being careful not to
breach the stay.
In effect, the creditor must force the debtor to buy its co-
operation. Such cooperation may be necessary at almost
every stage of the reorganization proceedings, not only in
matters directly involving the parties, such as motions for
relief from stay and provision of "adequate protection," but
also when the debtor seeks cooperation of its creditors to ob-
tain, for example, permission to use, sell or lease collateral,
extension of time or permission to obtain new credit. Ulti-
mately, the creditor must seek to obtain the best treatment of
its interest under a plan as is reasonably possible, or if neces-
sary, to recover some or all of its collateral. Thus the credi-
tor must monitor the proceedings for failure by the debtor in
possession to take all steps necessary under the Code, and
for continued losses or depletion of the collateral and busi-
ness failure.
If the steps suggested in this article are taken by the cred-
itor, it may emerge from the reorganization proceedings in a
strong, if not stronger, position than when it entered them, as
the debtor in possession, freed from the burden of excessive
debt, successfully reorganizes and continues doing business
with the creditor and others in the future. Such is the hope
of the drafters of the Code. The intended result, preserva-
tion of a viable economic entity which can contribute to the
nation's economy and provide a potential continued source
of employment, is surely in the interest of all concerned.
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